Approved For Release 2004/12/01: CIA-RDP79R01095A001300010018-8

SECRET

POST-TETO YUGOSLAVIA

I. INTRODUCTION

The scope and purpose of the paper -- the principal questions addressed -- the line of march.

- II. YUGOSLAVIA ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE SUCCESSION PERIOD (30-35%)
 - A. General Background: A brief summary of the basic intelligence information which will serve to simplify and clarify subsequent discussion.
 - B. The Yugoslav System: Current Features and Trends. A brief discussion of the following:
 - 1. Domestic Policy: Self-management -- decentralization,
 pluralism, domestic freedoms and controls, succession
 arrangements, projected reforms.
 - 2. Economic Policy: Self-management -- decentralization, market forces, foreign trade and investment, principal problems (uneven levels of development, financial and material resources, trade difficulties).
 - 3. Foreign Policy: Nonalignment in practice -- rajor features of Yugoslav policy toward the West, the covict bloc. its Balkan neighbors, China, and the Third World.
 - 4. Defense Policy: All-People's Defense, armment levels and procurement, the role and reliability of the professional armed forces. An annex will cover Yugoslavia's capability to resist military inhervention by Warsaw Pact forces.
 - C. Principal Internal Factors Which Will Affect Future Developments.
 - 1. National animosities as they affect both political and economic affairs.
 - 2. Dissident elements.
 - 3. Economic performance.
 - b. The Party and military establishments.

Approved For Release 2004/12/01: CIA-RDP79R01095A001300010018-8

SECRET

III. ALTERMATIVE FUTURES FLOWING FROM COMESTIC DYNAMICS (IOLICE)

- A. Divisive forces are contained and Yugoslavia survives the passing of Tito as a united, independent, and nonaligned state.
- B. Internal turmoil reaches a level which threatens to paralyze or fragment the state. The military establishment stages a coup to restore order.
- C. With both the Party and the military establishment too divided to halt the process, regional rivalries result in the de facto or actual break-up of the Yugoslav state.

 Extensive fratricidal warfare may be involved.

IV. MAJOR EXTERNAL INFLUENCES (30-35%)

- A. The Soviet Bloc.
 - 1. The USSR.
 - a. The Soviet threat in general terms: intentions and past tactics.
 - b. Current Soviet behavior and capabilities.
 - 2. Moscow's allies in Eastern Europe: a house divided, the special problem of Bulgaria.
- B. The West: Attitudes, actions, and capabilities.
 - 1. The US and the NATO powers.
 - 2. The neutral states of Europe.

V. POST-TITO SCENARIOS (15-20%)

- A. General discussion of the factors (including possible Yugoslav initiatives and counter-measures) which could affect Soviet and Western options and inclinations.
- B. Titoist Yugoslavia.
- C. Junta Yugoslavia.
- D. Fragmented Yugoslavia.

Approved For Release 2004/12/01 : CIA-RDP79R01095A001300010018-8

SECRET

--3--

V. CONCLUSIONS

VI. ANNEX: Yugoslav Military Capabilities

SECKET